2025年 第3期 DOI:10.19830/j.upi.2024.181
城市人口高度集聚的博弈解释与疏导路径
Game Analysis and Mitigate Path of Urban Population Density Polarization
彭坤焘 赵煜
PENG Kuntao, ZHAO Yu
关键词:有限理性;城市体系;核心—边缘;社区生活圈;博弈论
Keywords:Bounded Rationality; Urban System; Core-Periphery; Neighborhood Living Circle; Game Theory
摘要:现实中超大、特大城市和部分大城市一直尝试疏解人口,缓解交通拥堵、公共服务挤兑、环境压力过大等尖锐问题;反之,部分城市和城区却面临人口流失和密度过低的挑战,需要应对用地低效、空间运行效率低、社会活力匮乏等问题。城市人口高度集聚与收缩塌陷的密度分化是空间非均衡的一体两面,体现了个体理性背离集体理性的区位选择。对此,笔者运用博弈方法剖析其现实逻辑,重点是集聚维度。研究发现,城市体系中个体理性选择使大城市规模过大且锁定;城市内部核心—边缘博弈中,节约总通勤距离的竞争导致核心过密,而功能对偶限制了迁移概率;在社区尺度,中密度或高密度均构成纳什均衡,但取决于空间垄断性供给。由此,人口疏导应立足于个体偏好与策略互动,以重构收益矩阵的方式引导人口密度合理布局。
Abstract:Mega cities and some large cities have been trying to alleviate serious problems such as traffic congestion, shortage of public services, and environmental pressure by reducing population. Conversely, some cities are facing challenges such as population loss and low density, need to address issues such as inefficient land use, low spatial efficiency, and lack of social vitality. The high concentration of urban population and the density collapse are two sides of spatial imbalance, reflecting the deviation of individual rationality from collective rationality. In this regard, game theory can be used to analyze its practical logic, with a focus on the agglomeration dimension. Research has found that individual rational choices in urban systems make large cities even larger and locked in; In the core-periphery game, the competition to save total commuting distance leads to an overly dense core, while functional duality limits the probability of migration; At the community scale, both medium and high density constitute Nash Equilibrium, but it depends on spatial supply. Therefore, population diversion should be based on individual preferences, and guide the rational allocation of population density by reconstructing the income matrix.
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基金项目:重庆市自然科学基金(CSTB2022NSCQ-MSX0359)
作者简介:作者: 彭坤焘,博士,重庆大学建筑城规学院,山地城镇建设与新技术教育部重点实验室,自然资源部国土空间规划监测评估预警重点实验室,副教授。
pekutao@sina.com
赵煜,重庆大学建筑城规学院,硕士研究生。923243231@qq.com
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